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Heuristics to characterise human behaviour in agent
based models
Claudia Pahl-Wostl and Eva Ebenhöh
Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany

Abstract: Human behaviour is one of the key factors to understand the causes for common pool resource
problems and to develop policies to promote more sustainable resource management regimes. Agent based
models can help to investigate the role of important processes in this respect such as factors determining the
degree of trust and cooperation in a group. We have chosen a pragmatic approach to represent human
behaviour by assuming that agents can be characterised by a set of attributes and their behaviour can be
described by a set of simple decision heuristics. Individual agents differ in their importance of attributes (e.g.
fairness, cooperativeness, trust), in their rules how to choose a heuristic, and in their responses to social
interactions. The assumptions are tested by using data from experimental economics describing the behaviour
of players in simple games dealing with resource allocation. A set of specific attributes and heuristics was
derived by analysing data from different games. The plausibility and generality of the behavioural model is
tested by applying it to different data sets from different games. We expect from these simulations insights
into behavioural patterns that determine processes of social learning and negotiation. The modelling approach
will be applied and tested with data from case studies where actors make decisions in a real world context of
dealing with a resource management problem.
Keywords: Heuristics, modelling human behaviour, experimental economics, cooperation, fairness

1.

INTRODUCTION

As early as 1968 Hardin in his famous article
entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons” described
a situation where villagers were using a common
field to graze their cattle. The commons tended to
be overgrazed since each villager would graze to a
point where the private costs equalled the benefits,
and social costs were neglected. In general, such a
situation applies to the problem of ‘common pool
resources’. And the tragedy of the commons is a
typical case of a ‘social dilemma’ where the
maximization of the short-term self-interest of the
individual, leaves all participants worse off than
feasible alternatives. Each individual faces a tradeoff between what is in his or her own short term
interest and what is in the broader interest of the
community in which he or she lives. A collective
version of social dilemmas occurs frequently in the
provision and management of public goods and
may account for many environmental problems
such as the overexploitation and pollution of water
resources, arable land and the atmosphere.
Hardin’s analysis suggested that the only solution
to preventing such social dilemmas would be
regulation of the commons by a central entity. This
would argue in favour of governmental regulation
and control as the most promising strategy for
dealing with environmental problems and
managing public goods. However, in her influential

book, Elinor Ostrom (1990) provided evidence that
Hardin’s analysis did not apply in general and that
local communities have efficient ways of selforganizing and self-governance and may also
prevent the degradation of resources on the base of
voluntary cooperation. Hence, an alternative
strategy would explore ways in which
governmental intervention and the self-organizing
capacity of communities interact and subtly
reinforce themselves so as to develop more
efficient and enduring resource management
regimes. Such a strategy suggests as well a stronger
role of participatory approaches in resources
management to facilitate collective learning and
choice processes. However, approaches to manage
common pool resources are still hampered by a
lack of understanding the nature of human
behaviour.
The prisoners’ dilemma and game theoretical
approaches have mainly been used to analyse
human behaviour in the context of common pool
resource problems (Gintis, 2000). The basic
underlying assumption has been the profitmaximizing, rational homo economicus. Such
approaches provide little potential for analysing the
possibilities of cooperation and self-governance.
Empirical and experimental evidence show
considerable
deviations
from
theoretical
assumptions based on homo economicus. In

particular, the emerging field of experimental
economics has developed a set of games and has
collected a rich data base on human action in a
number of experimental situations where fairness
and equity issues in the allocation of rewards play
an important role. The potential for innovation
from these insights has not been fully exploited yet.
Whereas most approaches to explain behaviour
have been based on analytical mathematical
approaches and extensions of game theory, more
recently agent based modelling has been used to
analyse and explain data from economic games
(e.g. Duffy, 2001; Deadman, 2000; Ebenhöh and
Pahl-Wostl, 2004). Agent based simulation offers a
major methodological breakthrough in the ability
to investigate the role of different processes
determining human behaviour in more detail. The
method is also very flexible since it is not linked to
a specific disciplinary paradigm (Pahl-Wostl,
2002a).
We have decided to capture essential elements of
human behaviour in resource allocation problems
by assuming that agent behaviour is guided by
heuristics (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) and agents
learn from experience.
2.

MODELLING APPROACH

In the chosen modelling approach decisions are not
necessarily based on elaborate calculations, but on
heuristics, including simple rules humans may
follow in making their decisions. Those heuristics
depend on different attributes characterizing
individual agents. Another very important aspect is
agent diversity. Agents differ not only in their
individual attribute values, but also in the
heuristics they use.
We use data from economic experiments to support
our heuristics approach (see section 2.2). In
experimental economics various experiments are
conducted with human subjects, placed in an
artificial, laboratory environment in which they
have to solve tasks or play games with or against
each other. Usually those games are played
anonymously, in order to prevent the formation of
a social environment. In these situations, decision
making of the human subjects is supposed to be
abstracted from a specific context and social
interactions. This may be seen as a breach with
respect to actual human behaviour in day-to-day
situations. However, this method’s main advantage
is that it produces comparable and reproducible
data. The set of attributes presented in the next
section were derived from a number of
experiments from different games during the
process of developing agent based models that can
explain observed behaviour.

2. 1

Attributes

So far, our set of attributes includes nine different
characteristic traits. All attributes are represented
as real numbers in the interval between 0 and 1,
where 0 implies that this trait is not important for
the agent and 1 implies that it is very important. In
our model, the numbers are random numbers,
equally distributed, and the attributes are
independent from each other.
Cooperativeness: How important is group utility
for an agent? A high cooperativeness indicates the
willingness to spend individual resources in order
to further group resources. Mainly this is
associated with an increase in efficiency.
Fairness (concerning others): How important is it
for an agent that the other agents get roughly as
much as it? This is a purely comparative attribute
that does not refer to efficiency increases. Agents
with a high fairness are willing to spend money in
order to equalize the outcome. Note that this
fairness does not yet consider equity considerations
in reward allocations.
Conformity: How important is it for an agent to
appear to be as others expect it to be? Agents with
a high conformity may play fairly because they feel
they are expected to, and not because of their own
high fairness.
Fairness concerning me: How important is it that
the agent's payoff is roughly as high as the other
agents' payoffs? Agents with a high fairness
concerning me are easily annoyed at being treated
unfairly. However, whether or not this annoyance
leads to retaliating actions is defined by negative
reciprocity.
Positive reciprocity: How important is it to return
behaviour that is perceived as fair and cooperative,
with fair behaviour? An agent with a high positive
reciprocity feels committed to play cooperatively
in a second move when the other agents have
played cooperatively before.
Negative reciprocity: How much is an agent
willing to pay in order to make another agent pay
(more)? An agent with a high negative reciprocity
feels committed to punish in a second move when
the other agents have defected before.
Risk aversion: How risk averse is an agent? An
agent with a high risk aversion will not invest
anything in a project that yields a high but
uncertain return.
Commitment: How important are the decision to
be made and previously made agreements for an
agent? A player with a high commitment to a

project will invest in group utility even when its
cooperativeness is low.
Trustworthiness: To which degree does an agent
respond to trust placed in him or her by other
agents with expected behaviour instead of being
opportunistic?
In addition to all these attributes, agents hold
expectations about the attribute values of other
agents. They learn from observed behaviour about
the others’ attribute values. These are referred to as
expected cooperativeness, expected fairness etc.
Note that trust is modelled as expected
trustworthiness.
In literature on experimental economics attributes
like the ones described above, often appear without
being strictly defined. For example, fairness is
rarely differentiated into fairness concerning me
and fairness concerning others, although the
distinction is quite apparent. Likewise, positive and
negative reciprocity, are often considered as a
single attribute reciprocity (“strong reciprocity” in
Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). Also, names can
vary substantially. For example, what we refer to
as “fairness concerning me” is essentially the same
as “annoyance”, expressed by subjects in postexperimental questionnaires in an experiment by
Fehr and Gächter, and “negative reciprocity”
corresponds to “willingness to punish” in the same
experiment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Recently
Cox especially designed and conducted an
experiment to discriminate between trusting,
positively reciprocating, and altruistic, otherregarding behaviour (Cox, 2004). Cox uses trust
and positive reciprocity quite similar to the
attributes presented in this paper. However, we
differentiate other-regarding behaviour further into
cooperative and fair.
In this attributes approach lies a major difference
to other work combining experiments with agentbased models (Duffy 2001, Deadman 2000).
2.2 Heuristics
Heuristics usually make sense only in a concrete
decision environment. This is why the heuristics
presented here are given as examples for a specific
game. For our modelling approach, however, it is
also important that the heuristics chosen are more
generic to be applicable to a large range of
situations in experimental games and empirical
case studies. Therefore, the heuristics are kept as
simple as possible.
As example for a decision environment consider
the following two-player game, taken from an
experiment by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003). Both
players receive 10 money units (MU). The first

player is asked to give any number of his or her
money units to the second player. This gift is
tripled by the experimenter. Then, the second
player may return any number of MU from 0 to the
tripled gift to the first player. This is not tripled.
When the first player gave the gift, he or she is also
asked to indicate, how much he or she would like
to receive.
A main result of this experiment is, that most first
players do place trust in second players and most
second players reciprocate trust with returns
greater than 0. First players gave 6.5 MU on
average to second players. Second players returned
more than 40 percent of the tripled investment to
first players. The higher the gift of the first player,
the higher was the return by the second player
(Fehr and Rockenbach 2003, 138f.). However,
some first players gave less than 5 MU (26.5%)
and some second players kept everything to
themselves (16%).
The first player's first decision may depend on
cooperativeness,
because
of
efficiency
considerations. Risk aversion may play a role,
because a gift of 10 money units may be returned
doubled or even tripled, but the return might also
be 0. Finally, the expected trustworthiness is an
indicator for perceived risk and thus may also be
important. The first player's second decision, how
much he or she would like to receive, is probably
only influenced by fairness concerning others and
fairness concerning me.
Table 1: Some heuristics for the 1st player's decision:
A1 gift = 0 MU
A2 gift = 5 MU
A3 gift = 10 MU
A4 gift = cooperativeness * 10 MU
A5 gift = (1-risk aversion) * 10 MU
A6 gift = expected trustworthiness * 10 MU
A7 if (exp. trustworthiness < low limit)
gift = 0 MU
else if (exp. trustworthiness > high limit)
gift = 10 MU
else gift = expected trustworthiness * 10 MU
A8 if (expected trustworthiness > some limit AND
risk aversion < another limit)
gift = cooperativeness * 10 MU
A9 calculate expected return with expected fairness,
expected fairness concerning me and expected
positive reciprocity for different gifts and take gift
with highest expected return.

Although the second player’s task is very similar to
the first player’s first decision (deciding on an
amount of money to give to the other player), the
attributes needed are different. The second player’s
decision is not influenced by risk aversion and
expected trustworthiness. However, it may be
influenced by fairness considerations, both

concerning others and concerning me, as well as
positive reciprocity and trustworthiness.
Table 2: Some heuristics for the 2nd player's decision:
B1 return = 0 MU
B2 return = gift
B3 return = 2*gift
B4 return = fairness * 2*gift
B5 return = (1-fairness concerning me) * 2*gift
B6 if (fairness < low limit)
return = 0
else if (fairness > high limit)
return = 2*gift
else
return = fairness * 2*gift
B7 if (trustworthiness < low limit)
return = 0
else if (trustworthiness > high limit)
return = asked return
else
return = fairness * 2*gift

2.3

Choosing Heuristics

Heuristics should be as simple as possible. In order
to do that, we give certain agents certain heuristics
according to their attributes, thus moving the case
differentiation out of the heuristic (as in A7, B6,
and B7). A typical way of doing so would be:
if (agents cooperativeness > high limit)
use cooperative heuristic (A3)
else if (agents cooperativeness < low limit)
use maximizing heuristic (A9)
else use default heuristic (A7)

By this, the agents’ attributes determine their
decision making behaviour in two ways. The
chosen heuristic as well as the actual decision
made by the chosen heuristic both depend on the
attribute values (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Role of attributes in the decision
making process
2.4 Learning

Learning takes place in two different ways. The
first and easier kind of learning is the adjustment of
expected attributes to the experiences made by the
agents. In our model, so far, the agents start with
believing others to be exactly like themselves. If
they make, for instance, cooperative experiences
exceeding expectations the value of expected
cooperativeness is increased. However, the
adjustment is not necessarily exact, because the
agents do not perceive the other agents’ attributes
directly, but only their decisions.
The second learning process affects heuristics. If
an agent makes negative experiences using one
heuristic, in some cases these experiences should
lead to an exchange of that heuristic by another
possible one. If, in the above case, an agent with a
high cooperativeness uses cooperative heuristic
and gets a return of 0, it might consider this
heuristic to be inappropriate the next time a similar
decision has to be made, although neither its own
cooperativeness nor any expected attribute value
has changed. In the example presented here,
however, this kind of learning does not take place.
The attribute values themselves do not change over
the time scale of the model simulations. Changes
in attributes may occur over longer time scales,
months or years.
3.

TESTING
ASSUMPTIONS
EXPERIMENTAL DATA

WITH

The example in the previous section shows that
even with a simple decision task there may be a
great number of possible heuristics that could
explain human behaviour. In order to test model
assumptions, we use data from experimental
economics (Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl, 2004).
Laboratory experiments provide us with a rich data
base of individual human behaviour in simple
controllable settings. By variations of the
experimental settings, we can focus on different
aspects of human behaviour. We base our choice
of heuristics used in the model on the data and
accompanying questionnaires. Furthermore, the
process in which the agents choose between the
heuristics is also derived from data. In order to be
able to do this, we have to analyse individual and
not only aggregated data. The representation of
individual data is an important advantage of agentbased modelling compared to other modelling
techniques (see also Duffy 2001, 309). However, it
requires agent behaviour to
be more
psychologically plausible, than if only aggregated
data were to be reproduced (Jager, Janssen, 2002,
99).

But even representation of individual data may not
be sufficient to model the actual human behaviour.
In the previous example, the game design does not
allow us to distinguish trusting behaviour from
genuinely cooperative behaviour. That is, we do
not know if a first mover invested money, because
he or she expected the other player to return a part
of the tripled investment, or if the utility increase
by tripling the investment was reason enough for
him or her to give money away. Likewise we do
not know, whether returned amounts are due to
positive reciprocity or a sense of fairness (cf. Cox,
2004, p. 264 in a comment on a similar experiment
by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995).
Reciprocity assumes that the player who trusts
another player expects to trigger a social norm of
fairness that is stronger than the possible desire to
defect and maximize individual utility.
Such differences may be important to understand
behaviour in real world settings. However, one
question arises for all experimental approaches –
how far can insights from such experiments be
transferred to situations in real world settings?
4.

PROSPECTS

The attribute approach presented in this paper is
guided by empirical analysis and modelling
practices rather than psychological theory. In
psychology there are some “trait approaches”
(Liebert and Spiegler, 1994) to explain human
behaviour on the basis of dispositions, defined as
“enduring, stable personality characteristic(s)”
(Liebert and Spiegler, 1994, 156). For our
modelling purpose, however, empirically tested
traits, like the “big five” (neuroticism,
extraversion,
openness,
agreeableness
and
conscientiousness) are too broad and general
compared with the attributes chosen. In order to
merge psychological theory with the model
assumptions, one would have to conduct thorough
empirical investigations on the correlation between
the super traits and our attributes and how the
super traits translate via attributes into observed
behaviour.
To understand key behavioural phenomena as trust
and cooperation requires an interdisciplinary
approach in the social sciences combing insights
from economics, psychology and sociology. Here
data from experimental economics have their
limitations. Social interactions are largely
excluded. While experiments in economics often
emphasize the generality of a situation and
comprise monetary rewards and repeated trials,
psychologists try to capture intrinsic motivations
and the mental processes at work in a particular
decision situation, what has been termed the

framing of a decision problem. Hence it will be of
major interest to test insights gained from
experimental economics in real world settings
where social interactions, context and framing play
a major role.
The concepts developed in this modelling
approach are currently tested in a number of case
studies dealing with collective decision making
processes and collaborative governance in the
management of common pool resource problems.
The typical methodological case study design
includes participatory integrated assessment and
modelling approaches. The decision context refers
either to groups of stakeholders such as farmers
engaging in collective action and cooperative
governance of a common pool resource or to
processes of social learning and negotiation in
moderated group settings (Pahl-Wostl, 2002b).
Moderated group settings include an actors’
platform with representatives from stakeholder
groups who engage in processes of social learning
and collective decision making over a period of 1-2
years. A typical platform is expected to involve the
following sequence of steps (Pahl-Wostl, 2002b):
(1) Build up a shared problem perception in a
group of actors, in particular when the problem
is largely ill-defined (this does not imply
consensus building).
(2) Build trust as base for a critical self-reflection,
which implies recognition of individual mental
frames and images and how they pertain to
decision making.
(3) Recognize
mutual
dependencies
interactions in the actor network.

and

(4) Reflect on assumptions about the dynamics and
cause-effect relationships in the system to be
managed.
(5) Reflect on subjective valuation schemes.
(6) Engage in collective decision and learning
processes (this may include the development of
new management
strategies
and
the
introduction of new formal and informal rules
and resource allocation schemes).
This sequence describes an idealized case. In
reality quite a few obstacles may impede such
cooperative learning and decision making
processes. A crucial variable is the willingness to
cooperate and trust between stakeholders
participating in such a process (Panebianco and
Pahl-Wostl, 2004).
In contrast to the experimental game settings the
settings in case studies are determined by context
and history. The actors know each other and hold

expectations about the attributes of other
individuals (in contrast to expectations about an
average other agent in the game settings). They
hold general expectations about expected degrees
of cooperativeness and fairness that are determined
by their prior experience and their cultural and
social environment. At the same time the attributes
of an individual actor are not assumed to be
invariants but are assumed to be shaped in a longterm learning process determined by experience
and the social and cultural environment. Hence
one can conclude the social environment and the
mutual expectations are partly socially constructed.
And we can expect that attributes change over the
time period of observation.
Role playing games have been used to generate
trust in a stakeholder group and build a shared
understanding of the problem (steps 1-3 in the
above listed sequence). Such role playing games
have been combined with agent based simulation
models in an iterative fashion to elicit new insights
about decision making strategies, and support the
development of new strategies (e.g. Pahl-Wostl
and Hare, in press, Barreteau et al 2001). The
empirical investigations can be compared with the
heuristics derived from experimental games.
Figure 2 shows an example of a bargaining routine
that was elicited during a role playing game in a
stakeholder
platform,
a
situation where
experimental results from dictator and ultimatum
games can be quite useful (Ebenhöh and PahlWostl, in review).
Man: set price equal to
last offer price

NO
Will HA haggle?

Man: set offer price

YES
HA compares prices of all
manufacturers
and selects lowest

HA suggests counteroffer
of 10-30% lower
NO
YES
Man
accepts
offer

Finance problem?

NO
YES
Finances v. good?

Man
splits
difference

NO
Man rejects
counteroffer

Figure 2 Bargaining algorithm between Housing
Association and Manufacturer of Sanitary
Technologies (Hare, Heeb and Pahl-Wostl, 2002)
Currently work is ongoing to test the applicability
of the modelling approach described in section 3 in
a number of case studies. Specific emphasis is
given to:
-

Applicability of attributes listed in section 3 to
characterize actors in real world settings.

-

Applicability of heuristics to characterize actor
behaviour in real world settings.

-

The dynamics of learning processes (individual
attributes, expectations, and heuristics) over
different time scales in real world settings.

-

The importance of context and history in case
studies for understanding human behaviour in
contrast to the context free, mostly anonymous
experimental game settings.

An improved understanding of the importance of
trust and cooperation and the use of simple
heuristics in learning and decision making
processes will support the development of
improved participatory approaches and decision
support tools in the management of common pool
resources.
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